and demonstrates that many among Sinn Féin's leadership kept in mind the extreme importance of the international community to achieve a degree of independence. To send a delegation of Irish representatives to the Peace Conference was very important not only politically but also symbolically. European opinions were scrutinized, the governments contacted. The reactions of the continental public to Sinn Féin's victory and the formation of the Dáil became an important matter of concern. A propaganda war had to be won to ensure that Ireland's first months of existence as a free nation would allow the establishment of Irish diplomacy. This was one of the first prerequisites of the recognition of Irish national sovereignty by the international community.
3
In this context, France and French public opinion became major objectives of Sinn Féin's strategy. Paris hosted the Peace conference. Therefore, relations with the French government and, most importantly, the French press, were relatively easy to organise. Moreover, France was placed in a difficult situation by Great Britain during the negotiations and in the following years, with the British government often challenging French demands on the payment of war reparations by Germany. This could lead the Irish envoys to believe that French opinion would grow increasingly impatient with its ally in the war, and return to previous Anglophobic attitudes. Furthermore, France was a republic, whose image as an ideological model for many Irish republicans and as an ally of Ireland against Great Britain played a major role in the development of an Irish separatist narrative during the 19 th century; a rhetoric that did not only look at Anglo-Irish relations to define the place of Ireland in the world, but also to continental Europe. Of course, the development of stronger links with Germany and the 1916 Rising had altered these representations of Franco-Irish connections. However, defeated Germany could not be of much use in 1919. As a consequence, the French dimension of the diplomacy of Irish delegates during the Peace Conference was concerned with pragmatic considerations accompanied by a romantic image of republican France and of its public opinion, always prompt to support oppressed nationalities, more particularly so when the oppressor was English. At least this was the France that lived in Irish nationalist memories; and this in spite of past governmental policies that could have altered this representation, with the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 and the implementation of the Law of the Separation of the Churches and the State in 1905.
4
Quite independently from the nature of the Irish representations of France until the beginning of the 20 th century, to limit this analysis to one particular country will provide a better understanding of the embryonic structure of Irish diplomacy, its dynamics, objectives, methods and results. This article will show the great importance which the development of an Irish diplomacy held for the affirmation of the country's independence and the extreme difficulties facing young and largely inexperienced diplomats; in short, it will analyse the implementation of a pragmatic Irish diplomatic policy which faced the realities of the raison d'État.
Ireland and France during the First World War 1 5
Despite the efforts of a radical fringe of nationalist leaders, Ireland did not escape the massacre of the First World War, with 210,000 soldiers sent into the trenches, of whom an estimate of 35,000 2 did not make it back, even though the precise figure is subject to debate. Therefore, it is essential to study the influence of the war on the Irish political context if we are to understand properly the establishment of Irish diplomacy in the The World in Paris and Ireland too: The French Diplomacy of Sinn Féin, 1919 Féin, -1921 Études irlandaises, 36-2 | 2012 1920s and its relations with France. As David Fitzpatrick explained, the European conflict is at least as important in understanding the radicalisation of Irish political life as the the 1916 Easter Rising 3 . Ireland's story during the First World War is one of transition, of failure and of rebirth. Central to these three phenomena were Europe and France, present in pain as well as in victory.
6
The Irish political context before and at the very start of the war is well known. There was the apparent march towards civil conflict in 1912 and 1913, marked by the creation of the unionist Ulster Volunteer Force and of the nationalist Irish Volunteers. This was put to a halt by the outbreak of the war and the decision announced by John Redmond in his Woodenbridge speech to support the allies' war effort. The split in the Irish Volunteers followed immediately, resulting in a division between the Irish Volunteers, who opposed Redmond's decision and were led by Eoin MacNeill, and the National Volunteers, who were under the leadership of John Redmond. . Along with a more traditional rhetoric on the fate of small nations, which allowed Redmond to associate his support for the allies with the fate of small and Catholic Belgium, he mentioned France in particular. By using the theme of Celtic identity, Redmond wanted to make the war the symbol of pan-Celtic solidarity. This was the occasion to demonstrate the values of a Celtic "race" led by Ireland and France; a common identity articulated over the preceding decades by the promoters of what Matthew Kelly called cultural separatism 5 . In fact, throughout the war, Redmond and the newspapers who supported his action, such as the Freeman's Journal, associated with and encouraged the French war effort. In doing so, the newspaper was supporting the allies without emphasising the role of Great Britain. Even before the Woodenbridge speech, the Freeman had demonstrated this sort of approach 6 . This approach becomes clear when it is compared with the propaganda of the unionist press, where the French and British war efforts were linked 7 .
8
Despite the good-will of pro-ally Irish newspapers, a growing awareness by the French government of anti-allies declarations can be detected. In December 1914, in a memorandum on the state of Irish opinion, Thomas Power O'Connor, who was working in constant contact with the French, pointed out the work of a little group of radicals using French anticlericalism to discredit the French war effort 8 . The importance of the Catholic Church in Ireland was well enough known in France to force the government to take action. This appeared all the more urgent since the Irish clergy, while supporting the allies, was aware of Germany's good relations with the Vatican and of the fact that the Germans received the support of some cardinals of the Curia 9 , this at a time when recruitment was starting to slow down in Ireland 10 .
9
At the beginning of 1915, the French government decided to tackle the problem by inviting an Irish delegation to Paris, between 30 April and 1 May. The declared objective was to renew the friendly feelings of Irish Catholics towards France. The delegation was mostly composed of members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians led by Joseph Devlin. The President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, and the President of the Council, the anticlerical René Viviani, were present to welcome them. Speeches were made, with Thomas O'Connor reflecting on the Celtic blood that French and Irish soldiers had shed in past battles against a common foe 11 . Religious affairs were left to Devlin who highlighted the fact that priests had fought in the trenches and showed himself "very touched by the precious token of Catholic sympathy that was given". Devlin did not omit to conclude with the advent of a "new France 12 ", to underline the renewal of religious practice in the country since the beginning of the war. For the time being, French anticlericalism had to be buried under declarations of renewed Franco-Irish Catholic bonds. In the months following the visit, this new France, cleansed from all her amoral and godless actions, was promoted in the Freeman's Journal 13 .
10 Faced with this pro-allies agitation, nationalists opposed to the sending of Irish troops to the continent had to react. In fact, through a succession of very small newspapers 14 , the anti-allies camp took the time to develop quite a complex propaganda in the first two years of the war. It could have been expected that, as an answer to the Freeman propaganda, these newspapers would have emphasised France's recent past of anticlericalism. But the manner in which Irish separatists, in particular Arthur Griffith, addressed the question of French involvement in the war was rather complex and uneasy. This is not to say that France was never targeted by the anti-allies press. It was, and sometimes quite aggressively so 15 . However, it is also important to acknowledge the existence of an approach that was not one sided, in particular during the first two years of the war. . After several years of blindness, France was finally waking up to the realities of its alliance with the Devil. 13 The aftermath of 1916 largely changed this approach. First of all, most of the small antiallies newspapers did not survive the introduction of state censorship after the rising. Griffith's abilities alone allowed Nationality to survive until the end of the war. In the last two years of the war, this newspaper clearly dropped all caution when addressing the French involvement in the war. This evolution of tone was also expressed in the Catholic Bulletin. Having been relatively friendly towards France at the start of the war, after the rising it refuted France's right to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine
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, which it had regarded as a legitimate demand until then. We may conclude that one myth had replaced another as the 
The difficult beginnings of Irish diplomacy in Paris
14 During the first six months of 1919, until the signing of the Versailles Treaty on 28 June, government representatives in the council of the big Four (France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States) met continuously. Germany was not invited to these discussions but was presented with the decisions concerning its own political and economic future. These men also decided on the creation of new borders with the delegates of more than 30 countries who met each other while staying in Paris for the duration of the negotiations. Of these delegates, some had come to ask the victorious nations to acknowledge their right to create an independent country. Their hopes were high, but if these small nationalities with their claims had not previously been part of one of the defeated powers, their chances of success were slim. This was the rather difficult position faced by the unofficial delegation whose activity will be scrutinised in the next few pages: Ireland.
15 Setting up a non-official government was not an easy task for the Dáil's representatives. Each strategic post had to be filled with young people who were energetic and talented, but for the most part inexperienced. Sinn Féin's objective was to make the British administration obsolete. There was one domain where the Sinn Féin leaders' lack of experience was blatant: diplomacy. Nevertheless, de Valera counted upon the positive results of the Sinn Féin delegation in Paris, which he believed could gain international The French side of the work here has been most disappointing; the French press and politicians are very anxious to keep on good terms with England and they are so afraid of the Germans that I think this policy will be kept up […] The only way to effective propaganda is to get personal introductions to well-known and influential people and to get French writers interested in this way 29 .
18 Duffy's decision to develop a specific policy towards journalists and influential writers became a reality during the year 1920. But for the time being, he could do no more than observe the failure of his efforts, as there was a strong willingness within French opinion to maintain good relations with Great Britain in order to see Germany pay the "reparations" in full. In several letters Gavan Duffy repeated the difficulties he had to make contact with respectable newspapers and influential journalists. His main target ." Quite interestingly, we should add that no matter how elusive the press and the French authorities were, this did not stop them from trying to promote the image of France in Ireland. We can take the example of a letter dated 6 February 1919, sent by the publishing company Bloud and Gay to the French consul in Dublin, Alfred Blanche. According to this letter, the publisher had been given the responsibility by the consul to "make France better known" and to "shield Ireland from German influence 31 ". . But Sangnier was not a newcomer, and Gavan Duffy continued to experience many difficulties in trying to diversify his political allies. Public opinion, always changeable and versatile, remained to be won over by active propaganda. Clearly the two men had met the day before this letter was sent. Causse-Maël outlined in six points the stages through which the Irish cause could achieve a level of recognition among the French press. He offered a "sustained effort in society" which "would soon garner interest for your cause from politicians and intellectuals whose influence is real". He also suggested co-operating with an information agency, which "would slip into the sheets sent to the newspapers the telegrams the most likely to revert or eradicate the influence of the English press." ." This task was carried out simultaneously with propaganda from Ireland itself. The republican Desmond FitzGerald, chief of publicity, was responsible for maintaining good relations with foreign correspondents based in London. He obtained some significant results and explained the necessity to Duffy of putting into practice an eternal obsession of Irish nationalists: to "educate" European journalists about Irish realities 42 . On the same day, Duffy sent a report to FitzGerald, celebrating the progress made with the French press; possibly a direct consequence of the agreement reached with Causse-Maël:
The French campaign is so much bigger […] I felt sure that it would not be long before the French press generally opened its columns wide to us, in self-defence against England […] we were beyond the pale; but opinion is moving. "L'éclair" also wants to send a correspondent of its own at our expense to Dublin . 28 These two newspapers provided Gavan Duffy with the justification and recognition necessary to the continuation of his work in good conditions. This atmosphere of sweet optimism which oozed from the Irish press was so widespread and Duffy's reports on the evolution of his work in Paris were so positive, that on 31 August 1920 he received a letter offering him an increase of his staff 49 . But how pragmatic were these reactions?
29 The propaganda operations organized by Duffy understandably aroused the interest, the suspicion and the uneasiness of the French authorities, who were trying to prepare 30 For the most part, Sinn Féin was rather hostile to socialist ideals, and most of its representatives gave little importance to the workers' movement. However, several French socialists identified themselves with the Irish nationalist struggle. This tendency was shared by all the European left wing. The Soviet Union rapidly took an interest in Ireland's clandestine government and sent delegates to meet Eamon de Valera in 1920. This was sufficient to alarm the French government. Before his expulsion from France, Gavan Duffy had already warned of the consequences of such talks in a report to Desmond FitzGerald:
I saw with alarm that the President recommends an envoy being sent to Russia and I hope this step will not be taken without consideration; if it is taken, we may as well at once give up all further political effort on the Continent. I do not in the least want to thrust my personal opinions on those concerned, but I refer to this because I know what the effect will be in France
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31 In 1920, the future certainly looked brighter than a year before. In fact, Sinn Féin's diplomatic efforts started to spread all over Europe. O'Kelly embarked on missions with Vatican delegates in Paris, and met Mussolini in Fiume to agree on a sale of arms which eventually failed. Moreover, the Italian parliament manifested some support for the "martyrdom of Ireland". For his part, Gavan Duffy began a propaganda mission in Spain in 1921 53 . In 1922, while Ireland lapsed into civil war, he remembered this diplomatic effervescence with nostalgia: "No country started its international career with a better [1919] [1920] [1921] Études irlandaises, 36-2 | 2012 potential than ours after the war 54 ." Nevertheless, according to Dermot Keogh, this reaction more than anything else responded to an "infectious optimism". Keogh has argued quite rightly that, compared to the British leaders, the Sinn Féiners did not have the necessary diplomatic weight to influence European chancelleries 55 . Moreover, when the Civil War broke out between anti-Treatyites and the Free State, the Irish diplomatic service abroad also became divided. Besides, on 25 February 1921, O'Kelly admitted that the reactions from the press and the opinion in France were still linked to the state of French relations with Great Britain. Still, it remained essential to the future of the embryonic Irish foreign service to insist on the progress already made and success yet to come. Thus the report ended on a note of optimism:
Since George V's last visit to Paris, the press has been instructed to avoid the Irish question as much as possible, so as not to give offence to England. The press is always therefore very reticent on Irish subjects. It appears to me that before long the French press must be very willing to give us big publicity because it seems practically certain that relations between France and England are becoming more and more strained 56 .
32 In spite of a rather unrealistic understanding of the future of Franco-British relations and of the advance made by Irish propaganda in France, credit must be given to the tone of the reports which Gavan Duffy sent to Dublin throughout 1920. He was a competent diplomat and propagandist, whose work had not been without effect. In the course of 1921, some French newspapers showed an increasingly pronounced support for Sinn Féin and the republicans. These still came from the same socialist or conservative nationalist circles, but at least Gavan Duffy had succeeded in strengthening their friendship.
33 On 5 October 1921, the writer and future member of the Académie Française, Pierre Benoit, contacted O'Kelly to let him know about the forthcoming release of his last novel, La Chaussée des Géants (The Giant's Causeway) 57 . Benoit was then only starting his career, but he quickly asserted himself as an intellectual close to the Catholic nationalist Maurras and his newspaper, the Action Française. The Revue Universelle, founded on 1 April 1920 by Jacques Bainville and Henri Massis, which could be considered a satellite of Maurras' newspaper, published La Chaussée des Géants in a serial form between October 1921 and March 1922. Pierre Benoit's support for Irish national demands was consistent with the thought of Catholic, conservative and nationalist circles since the end of the nineteenth century. For many of these men, Ireland was a traditional, rural and Catholic island that had escaped the perverse cosmopolitan amorality of industrialisation and urbanisation. Some ideological references strengthened the links, such as the image of Joan of Arc, the maiden warrior who freed France from the yoke of foreign troops. capitalism and were working against the only true nation: the Irish workers 60 To come back to the subject of this article, we can only be struck by the constant efforts which Sinn Féin leaders made to reach French public opinion and governmental circles while the IRA was multiplying ambushes in Ireland. Obtaining international recognition was one thing, ensuring that European opinion would pressurize British leaders was another -and one that mattered more. This attitude certainly shows that Irish separatists at the start of the twentieth century were far from defining themselves in a purely Anglo-Irish context. On the contrary, it was essential for them to find other sources of identification in order to assert Ireland in Europe and in the world. In this context, France and its republican tradition, victorious if ill-treated ally of Great Britain, was a great source of preoccupation, inspiration and hope for Sinn Féin leaders. Of course, the realities of international politics quickly caught up with men who still had insufficient means to measure up to British diplomatic power. Results were therefore scarce. However, it was seen by all as a first step towards independence. In fact, the years that followed were to prove how essential those first steps in the big world were to Ireland's definition and self-affirmation as an independent nation. 
